In the present work we analyze the dynamics of indirect connections between insurance companies that result from market price channels. In our analysis we assume that the stock quotations of insurance companies reflect market sentiments which constitute a very important systemic risk factor. Interlinkages between insurers and their dynamics have a direct impact on systemic risk contagion in the insurance sector. We propose herein a new hybrid approach to the analysis of interlinkages dynamics based on combining the copula-DCC-GARCH model and Minimum Spanning Trees (MST). Using the copula-DCC-GARCH model we determine the correlation coefficients in the distribution tails. Then, for each analysed period we construct MST based on these coefficients. The dynamics is analysed by means of time series of selected topological indicators of the MSTs. Our empirical results show the usefulness of the proposed approach to the analysis of systemic risk in the insurance sector. The times series obtained from the proposed hybrid approach reflect the phenomena occurring on the market. The analysed MST topological indicators can be considered as systemic risk predictors.
with an acceptable level of accuracy for both the forecast of the occurrence of a systemic event and its financial effects. The subject of this article fits into the current of research focusing on the search for such a method. We focus on the structure of interlinkages between insurance companies, which plays a key role in the spread of systemic risk in this sector.
The article is a response to the clue and task left in the work of Alves et al. (2015) , which appeared in the European System Risk Board. This work contains an analysis of the network of 29 largest European insurance groups and their financial contractors. The authors note that insurance companies have direct exposures to other insurers, banks and other financial institutions through debt, equity and other financial instruments. These exposures can cause direct infection and thus spread of systemic risk. The work cited above focuses on direct connections between EU insurers and banks. At the same time, the authors emphasize that their research does not include an analysis of linkages between insurers under reinsurance contracts, indirect connections via market price channels and information channels, nor an analysis of banks' exposure to insurers.
In the present article, we focus on the problem of indirect links between insurance companies that result from market price channels. More specifically, we examine the dynamics of these relationships. In our analysis, we assume that stock market quotations of insurance companies reflect market sentiment, which is a very important systemic risk factor. It is well known that risk infection is always accompanied by negative market sentiment leading to customer panic in the financial industry. The results will create a vicious circle of risk and emotion. Thus, market sentiment is commonly used to forecast changes in the financial market and can be used as a systemic risk barometer (Kou et al., 2019) .
Relationships between insurers and their dynamics have a direct impact on propagation of systemic risk in the insurance sector. In our work, we propose a new hybrid approach to analyzing the dynamics of interconnections, based on combining the copula-DCC-GARCH and minimum spanning trees (MST). Using the copula-DCC-GARCH model, we determine dependency coefficients in distribution tails. Then, based on these coefficients for each analyzed period, we determine the "distance" matrix between insurance companies using the Mantegna metric (Mantegna and Stanley, 1999) and construct minimum spanning trees. We analyze the dynamics using selected topological indicators for the MST obtained.
The main purpose of the work is to check whether the time series of topological indicators of the network of connections between insurance companies obtained using the proposed hybrid approach reflect the situation on the financial market and whether they can be used as predictors of systemic risk in the insurance sector.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section reviews the subject literature devoted to systemic risk in the insurance sector. The third section presents the methodology and the empirical strategy used in the paper, the fourth one contains the data and a discussion of the results obtained, while the fifth and last one presents the conclusions.
2. Systemic risk in the insurance sector.
For over a decade, scientists have been trying to effectively define, study and measure the phenomenon of systemic risk, which in the era of globalization of economics is one of the most important concepts in the prediction of economic phenomena. Most scholars base their definition of uncertainty and risk on Knight (1921, p. 233) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , Camerer and Weber (1992) and Zweifel and Eisen (2012, p. 1) . In the work Eling and Pankoke (2016) 43 definitions are given, which indicate a three-stage course of the phenomenon: causes, event and effects for the real economy. One of the latest approaches is the concept of systemic risk proposed by De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) , in which a distinction is made between the risk of shocks based on their second-round effects (it focuses not on the institutions affected by shock, but on the consequences on linked institution). In addition, Harrington (2009) distinguishes between systemic risk and the risk of typical shocks. According to him, only the risk of an event associated with 'cross-contagious infection' (p. 802) should be considered systemic. Many researchers analyze the problem of SR in the context of the failure of a significant part of the financial sector and reduction of credit availability, e.g. Acharya et al. (2011) . Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) investigate the negative impact on credit supply, Bach and Nyuyen (2012), Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) financial system failure, Baur et. al. (2003) , Chen et al. (2013b) , Weiss (2011, 2013) , Weiß and Mühnickel (2014) the negative impact on the real economy, Baluch et al. (2011) the chain reaction of financial difficulties, Chen et al. (2013a) , Huang et al. (2009) many simultaneously defaulted pledges by large financial institutions, IAIS (2009), Jobst (2014), Radice (2010) the disruption of the flow of financial services, the negative impact on the real economy and impairment of all or part of the financial system, Klein (2011) studies the market in the context of financial system instability, idiosyncratic events and infection, Kress (2011) studies infection, Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) malfunctioning in the financial system and the negative impact on the real economy. In recent years, quantitative analysis of systemic risk using the described approaches has been carried out by, among others, Hautsch et al. (2015) , Giglio et al. (2016) , Benoit et al. (2017) , Jajuga al. (2017) , Bégin et al. (2017 ), Jurkowska (2018 .
The various concepts of systemic risk analysis presented above have inspired the creation of a number of different methods for measuring it. In the literature of the subject, several dozen measures can be indicated, which can be determined using mathematical, statistical, econometric, network modeling and predictive analysis tools (in particular, multidimensional statistical analysis, including methods of learning with and without supervision). A review of systemic risk measures in use can be found e.g in the following articles: Bisias et al. (2012) , Giglio et al. (2016), Di Cesare and Rogantini (2018) .
It is worth noting that while there is quite extensive a literature on the subject of systemic risk analysis in the banking sector, the insurance sector has been analyzed to a distinctly smaller extent. The reason for this was the belief that the group taking over, dispersing and redistributing the financial effects of risk does not generate a systemic threat.
However, after the financial crisis in 2007-2009 and the European public debt crisis in 2010-2012, a significant increase in interest in systemic risk in the insurance sector can be seen.
Before the crisis, there was a clear belief among researchers that this sector is systemically insignificant. However, in the literature that emerged as a result of the crisis, although previous conviction was maintained in many studies, there appeared articles indicating the possibility of the insurance sector creating systemic risk. Examples include works in which the authors believe that insurance companies have become an unavoidable source of systemic risk (e.g. Billio et al. 2012, Weiß and Mühlnickel 2014) and in which they claim insurance companies to be systematically significant, but only due to their non-traditional (banking) activities (e.g. Baluch et al. 2011 , Bednarczyk 2013 , Cummins and Weiss 2014 , Czerwińska 2014 and the overall systemic importance of the insurance sector as a whole is still subdued to the banking sector (e.g. Chen et al., 2013) . In turn, Bierth et al. (2015) after examining a very large sample of insurers in the long term, believe that the contribution of the insurance sector to systemic risk is relatively small, however, they claim that it peaked during the financial crisis in the period from 2007 to 2008. They also indicate that significant factors affecting the insurers' exposure to systemic risk are strong linkages between large insurance companies, leverage, losses and liquidity (the four L's: linkages, leverage, losses, liquidity). On the other hand, there are also studies (Harrington 2009 ) and (Bell and Keller 2009 ) claiming a complete lack of evidence for the systemic importance of the insurance industry.
After the aforementioned crises, supervisory authorities also began to pay more attention to the problem of systemic risk in the insurance industry. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), in consultation with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), identified nine global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) based on the assessment methodology developed by IAIS, which includes the following five elements: non-insurance activity of the insurer (45%), assessment of the degree of direct and indirect links of institutions within the financial system (40%), range of global activity (5%), the size of the insurance institution (5%), product substitutability (5%).
Since the publication of this methodology and the G-SII list, questions have been raised about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the proposed framework by both the insurance sector and academia. The ongoing discussion in the literature to date tend to show that some indicators in the IAIS assessment methodology may not be able to explain the insurers' contribution to systemic risk Mühlnickel 2014, Bierth et al. 2015) . Looking at the solutions adopted from the insurance industry, one can point to the example of MetLife, which was constantly struggling to remove the label of a "systemically important institution" and obtained a favorable ruling in the US District Court in March 2016 (Wall Street Journal 2016).
Following the success of MetLife, the AIG SIFI label was withdrawn by FSOC in September 2017, and Prudential Financial dumped its brand SIFI in October 2018.
To sum up, current literature and real events show that systemic risk in the insurance sector is still a challenge waiting for precise methodological solutions. After 2014, we observe an increased involvement of scientists in the qualitative and quantitative analysis of this issue. Our paper is one of the few quantitative studies on systemic risk in the European and global insurance sector. Although SR in in the financial sector is analyzed by: Bierth et al. (2015) , Mühlnickel and Weiß (2015) , Kanno (2016) , Giglio et al. (2016) , Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) , Koijen (2016) , Brownlees (2017) , Kaserer (2018) and risk infection is studied by Hautsch et al. (2015) , Härdle et al. (2016) , Fan et al. (2018) , nevertheless, none of these approaches is a hybrid approach in which the possibility of combining different measures would be analyzed on such a scale as proposed in our project.
Methodology.
We carry out the analysis of the dynamics of interconnections between insurance companies using a new hybrid approach based on the combination of the copula-DCC-GARCH model and minimum spanning trees (MST). The construction of minimum spanning trees based on the dependencies in the tails plays a key role in it. To this end, using two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models for each studied period , ( = 1, … , ) and each pair of rates of return , , , , ( , = 1, … , , > ) we estimate the bivariate joint distributions:
where , denotes the copula, while and , , , , respectively, are the joint cumulative distribution function and the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the marginal distributions at time . In turn, making use of the copulas , we estimate the pairwise lower tail dependence of the returns , , , :
Then, for each period t, we determine the "distance" matrix between insurance companies using the metric (Mantegna, Stanley, 1999) :
and using the Kruskal algorithm (Mantegna and Stanley, 1999) , we construct minimum spanning trees with vertices and − 1 edges.
Based on the trees thus obtained ( = 1 … ) we determine the time series of the following topological network indicators:
 The parameters α of the vertex degree distribution required to follow a power law,
It should be mentioned that in the literature the minimum spanning trees that evolve in time are also monitored by many other topological network indicators such as the Eigenvector Centrality (Tang et al. 2018) , MOL (Mean Occupation Layer) (Onnela et al. 2002 (Onnela et al. , 2003 , Normalized Tree Length (Onnela et al. 2003) , Tree Half-life (Onnela et al. 2003) ; Survival Ratio of the edges (Onnela et al. 2002, Sensoy and Tabak 2014) ; and Agglomerative Coefficient (Matesanz and Ortega 2015) .
In the next stage of research, we determine a time series for the CoVaR delta measure for each insurer. It brings along an information about the insurer's contribution to the systemic risk in the insurance sector. For this purpose, we also use two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models and the empirical strategy presented in the articles: Denkowska and Wanat (2019) , Wanat and Denkowska (2018a , 2018b . We assume that the European insurance sector is represented by the STOXX 600 Europe Insurance index. We compare the time series of CoVaR delta measures obtained in this way with the time series of topological indicators of the MST_t from the point of view of the possibility of using the latter as systemic risk predictors in the insurance sector.
The tail dependence coefficients ( ( , )) and the delta CoVaR measure, , which are key to the empirical strategy presented above, are determined using two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models. In the k-dimensional case in the DCC-GARCH model, the returns vector distribution = ( 1, , … , , ) which is conditional with respect to the set −1 of information available up to the moment − 1 is modelled using the conditional copulas proposed by Patton (2006) . It takes the following form:
Where denotes the copula, while and ,respectively, the multivariate distribution and the marginal distributions at the moment t. In general, one-dimensional returns can be modeled using different specifications of the average model and different specifications of the variance model (e.g. sGARCH, fGARCH, eGARCH, gjrGARCH, apARCH, iGARCH, csGARCH).
In our study the following ARMA process was used for all the series of returns: are identically distributed independent random variables (in the empirical analysis we considered the following distributions: normal, skew normal, t-Student, skew t-Student and GED). To describe the dependences between the rates of returns we used Student t-copulas, whose parameters were the conditional correlations obtained from the ( , ) model:
In this model ̅ is the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized rests , while ( = 1, … , ) and ( = 1, … , ) are scalar values, where describe the impact on current correlations of precedent shocks, and represent the influence on current correlations of the previous conditional correlations.
We estimate the parameters of the above copula-DCC-GARCH model using the inference function for margins (IFM) method. This method is presented in detail, among others in Joe (1997) . We perform the calculations in the R environment, using the "rmgarch" package. Allianz, headquartered in Munich, Germany, is the second largest European insurer in terms of assets. We include insurers analyzed in the work Network analysis of the EU insurance sector and nine additional ones 3 . We estimate the delta CoVaR measure assuming that the European insurance sector is represented by the STOXX 600 Europe Insurance index. We analyze weekly logarithmic rates of return for the period from January 7th, 2005 to December 20th, 2019.
In order to estimate ( , ) we consider various specifications for two-dimensional copula- (Sensoy and Tabak 2014) . For an undirected network, the degree of node is defined as the total number of links incident to it. The degree increases as a node becomes more connected and more central to the network. The degree distribution P(k) measures the frequency of nodes with different degrees in the network. As depicted in Fig. 1, sample 
Betweenness Centrality -BC.
This indicator is a measure of "being between" defined as the quotient of the number of shortest paths between vertices that pass through a given vertex and the number of all the shortest paths between vertices. It determines the "most important"
vertices of a given graph on a chart based on shortest paths (e.g. the most influential insurer).
For each pair of vertices in a connected graph, there is at least one path between them, so that either the number of edges that you have to pass (for unweighted graphs) or the sum of the weights of the vertices that you go through (for weighted graphs) is minimized. The BC measure of a given vertex is the number of those shortest paths that pass through it. This measure defines to what extent a given node (vertex) serves as an intermediary for other network nodes. A node with a higher BC has more control over the network because more information flows through it. Figure 2 shows the mean BC for the period under consideration and each of the insurance companies studied. Source: Own study.
The higher the vertex strength, the more systemically important a node is. From the diagram above we can infer that the most important are Aviva, AXA, Allianz, ING.
4.4. Closeness centrality (Bavelas 1950, Sensoy and Tabak 2014) This node proximity measure is a measure calculated as the inverse of the sum of the shortest path lengths between the given node and all nodes in the network. For MST, it is the inverse of the sum of the lengths of all edges. The more central the node is, the closer it is to all other nodes, it is thus a measure of the proximity of an insurer to the rest of the network. The average Closeness Centrality in the period studied and for each insurer considered is given in Fig. 4   Fig.4 . Average Closeness Centrality in the period under consideration.
Source: Own study.
The diagram analysis shows that the vertices are relatively close together. This may foster contagion.
The diagram below is a summary of the four-dimensional analysis of MST indicators. We present it with the intention to draw the reader's attention to the fact that there are institutions whose bars are in each case considered among the highest ones, which proves the importance of their corresponding vertex in the MST. information flow or mass transport in a given network. APL is one of the strongest measures of network topology, along with its clustering factor and degree distribution. It distinguishes an easy-to-access network from a more complex and inefficient one. The smaller the average path length, the easier the flow of information. Of course, we are talking about average so the network itself can have several very distant nodes and many adjacent nodes. The times series obtained for the APL is presented in Figure 6 . MaxDegree grows during periods of crisis, which means that in a group of insurers during a crisis some insurer has many more connections with others than is usual in the normal state. MSTs are scale-free, but during crises the alpha value is closer to 2, which means that the structure of MST is star-shaped with outstanding hubs having a high degree, i.e. multiple edges that connect the cmopany-hub to several companies with only one edge.
4.8. Diameter of the network (Diameter). It is determined by choosing from among all the shortest paths connecting any pair vertices the longest one. For MST, this is simply the longest path in the MST. The time series obtained for the Diameter is shown in Figure 9 . Diameter decreases during crises, which means that during these periods the path between the further apart lying MST vertices is shortened.
4.9. Rich Club Coefficient -RCC. The idea is that well-connected vertices connect also one with another. The RCC is defined to be ( ) = 2 > > ( > −1)
, where > ( > )−1 2 is the number of all the possible paths between > vertices, > is the number of vertices of > nodes having degree >k (Colizza et al. 2006 ) The effect of a rich club reduces system stability, which means that if RCC increases, then a perturbation can be more easily transmitted through the network.
The times series RCC obtained in the study is shown in Fig. 10 , while its distribution in the market states determined is presented in Fig. 11 . In all the states presented RCC is high, which means that the way the vertices are connected one to another is such that the highest degree vertices are linked together. Potentially, this creates the possibility of transferring turbulences.
4.10. Assortativity. The concept of assortativity was introduced by Newman (2002) and has been intensively studied since then. Assortativity is a graphic measure. It shows to what extent nodes in the network associate one to another by similarity or opposition (positive or negative mating). Basically, the network's assortatavity is determined for the degree (number of direct neighbors) of nodes in the network. Assortativity is expressed as a scalar -1 ≤ρ≤ 1. The network is said to be assortative when high-degree nodes are mostly connected to other high-degree nodes while low-degree nodes are mostly connected to other low-degree nodes. The network is said to be non-assortatative when high-degree nodes are connected mostly to low-degree nodes and low-degree nodes are mostly connected to high-degree nodes. Assortativity provides information on the structure of the network, but also on its dynamic behavior and robustness.
The assortativity time series is shown in Fig. 12 . Assortativity is negative, which means that in each state the tree is rather non-assortatative, i.e. the vertices tend to connect rather as negative mating. Which also confirms the previously described property of the network to be scale-free. -the period of the beginning of the crisis in the countries of the European Union related to the crisis in France associated with strikes, and in Italy due to the ever-growing public debt (which is now seven times higher than the debt in Greece), falling at the turn of 2017 and 2018. In our case it is exactly the period from April 21st, 2017 until May 11th, 2018.
-the period in between, which we call normal state.
The charts below present the expected values of the relevant MST topological indicators in the different market states. The results confirm the above description of indicators during crises and in normal state. 
Assort.Deg
Regime Below (Fig. 14) are sample MSTs at selected times: a tree that has a chain-like structure will slow down risk propagation, and one that has a star-shaped structure will foster it. On figures 15, 16, 17 we present the results obtained for deltaCoVaR. These are respectively the average deltaCoVaR value in the period studied, the distribution of this average in the different market states and the average deltaCoVaR value for each insurer in the period under consideration. They corroborate the fact that insurance companies contribute to systemic risk.
This contribution depends on the market state. Fig. 15 . Average deltaCoVaR.
The Mean.deltaCoVaR chart confirms the fact that insurance companies contribute to systemic risk. deltaCoVaR decreases in highlighted periods of crises. Fig. 16 . Average deltaCoVaR distribution in different market states.
On average, each company contributes to systemic risk. Fig.17 . Average deltaCoVaR for each insurer.
Conclusions.
Empirical results show the usefulness of network topology indicators for detecting systemic risk in the insurance sector. Time series analysis confirms market phenomena. The structure of MSTs changes along with the market situation. MST and their topological indicators are a tool that also allows you to cluster companies in the insurance sector and determine those that are play a significant role: the vertices through which risk may propagate; this is captured by the various types of notion of centrality studied in the present paper.
In times of crisis, the MST topology becomes more starlike and compact, accompanied by a stronger rich club effect. This network configuration is less resistant to shocks and more susceptible to contagion and transmission of the effects of the collapse on the financial market.
